MA S TER 
NEGA  TIVE 
NO.  93-81425 


MICROFILMED  1993 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES/NEW  YORK 


as  part  of  the  .     r.    •    *» 

"Foundations  of  Western  Civilization  Preservation  Project 


Funded  by  the     ^^„^^,,  xtt-ttcc 
NATIONAL  ENDOWMENT  FOR  THE  HUMANITIES 


Reproductions  may  not  be  made  without  permission  from 

Columbia  University  Library 


COPYRIGHT  STATEMENT 

The  coDvright  law  of  the  United  States  -  Title  17  United 
StSesCodl-  concerns  the  making  of  photocopies  or 
other  reproductions  of  copyrighted  material. 

Under  certain  conditions  specified  in  the  law,  libraries  and 
archives  are  authorized  to  furnish  a  photocopy  or  other 
Reproduction.  One  of  these  specified  conditions  is  that  the 
photocopy  or  other  reproduction  is  not  to  be  used  for  any 
purpose  other  than  private  study,  scholarship,  or 
?esearch."  If  a  user  makes  a  request  for,  or  "ater  "seS' ^  .^ 
DhotocoDV  or  reproduction  for  purposes  in  excess  of  fair 
SslrthiJ^uler  r?ay  be  liable  for  copyright  infringement 

This  Institution  reserves  the  right  [.% ref use  to  accept  a 
copy  order  if,  in  Its  judgement,  *u"*".""Jf "j  o*  ^^^  °'^^'^ 
would  involve  violation  of  the  copyright  law. 


A  UTHOR : 


PORTER,  NOAH 


TITLE: 


THE  SCIENCES  OF 
NATURE  VERSUS.. 

PLACE: 

NEW  YORK 

DA  TE : 

1871 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARHFT 


Master  Negative  # 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


0=C-wvo/w  . 


I  .    ._ 


0 


Yl.y   |-4tI 


Ui^l 


9tm<ti»0'»  ^<W^      ■ 


1 


FILM     SIZE: 


J5 


IB    UB 

2 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 
REDUCTION    RATIO:,  }}^__ 


IMAGE  PLACEMENT:   lA 

DATE     FILMED:______^2£.Cl^_     INITIALS    ^ 

FILMED  BY:    RESEARCH  PURUCA~TinM<;  TK|r  W^PP" 


Mir 


V 


Associatioii  for  Information  and  Image  Management 


1100  Wayne  Avenue.  Suite  1100 
Silver  Spring.  Maryland  20910 

301/587-8202 


Centimeter 


an 


1 


iiiiliiiiliiiiiiuiiniiliiiiliiii 


I 


Inches 


1 


I 


4         5        6         7        8        9        10       11       12       13       14       15   mm 

il''Ul!M'lj'Ml[Nil[iiil[iiil|Milm^ 

2  3  4  5 


.0 


I.I 


1.25 


I^i 


1^6 

m 
m 
u 


2.8 


2.5 


2.2 


1 4.0 


1.4 


2.0 


1.8 


1.6 


MfiNUFOCTURED  TO  RUM  STONDflRDS 
BY  fiPPLIED  IMRGE.    INC. 


r^jri^^'j^^J^*i£^ 


I 


I  0  I  Bo°k  p 

Columbia  College  Library 

Madison  Av.  and  49th  St.  New  York. 


J!eM\t<  i!i> 


SithjtuJ  Xo 


On 


I  hi  /i/,.!, 


<• 


.  -*-'*' 


..  .| 


^V^~^>j 


^■;^4i 

■ 

^^F%<r 

^ 

HH^^v      '^^ 

"^-a 

BM™P" 

%' 

B   ,^^-  " 

L     ^r. 

^ 

- 

^ 

«  <■ 

J 

^          '..r-^ 

"■^ 

k-i^'-'-- ^<^-i 

<\ 

^:^'>   -.r 

_^^ 

THE 


i-i,;  ; 


Sciences  of  Nature 


VERSUS 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


A  PLEA  FOR  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


BY 

NOAH     PORTER. 


"  I  walked  on,  mnsini?  with  myself 
♦     ♦     •     ♦     *     whether,  after  all, 
A  larger  metaphysics  might  not  help 
Our  physics." 

—Mrs.  E^B^ggovNiNq. . 


COI..COLL. 

[JBRARY 


&"MEAI3r. 

>■»■»  ■■  ■■-»-      -•  * 
187I. 


ITOD 


VN 


•^  I    ■! 


V 


\-^ 


I    I  I 

I  '  I 


'•■//' .  K\ 


\ 


Mi 


f. 
<? 

r 

T 


PREFACE. 


♦  •• 


Enterea  acconling  to  Act  of  Concrcps,  in  tne  year  1871, 

By  DODD  &  MEAD, 

in  the  Office  of  the  Librariun  of  Congress*,  at  Washington. 


I 


LANGE  Jk  HIIXMAN, 

PBINTERS  AND  8TERE0TYPEBS, 

108,110,112  4  114Woo.t«rSt., 
KSW  YORK. 


Portions  of  the  following  essay  were  deliv- 
ered as  an  address  before  the  Societies  of  the 
0,  B.  Ji.,  at  Harvard  and  Trinity  Colleges, 
in  June  and  July  last.  The  request  for  its 
publication  has  been  made  by  many  persons, 
and  in  form  by  a  committee  of  the  Society  in 
Trinity  College.  The  author  preferred  to  pub- 
lish the  whole  as  a  philosophical  essay,  with 
some  additional  paragraphs  and  notes.  No 
explanation  is  required  in  respect  to  the  in- 


15042 


VI 


PREFACE. 


terest  and    the  importance  of  the  subject — 
especially  at  the  present  time — in  this  country 


and  in  Great  Britain. 


N.  P. 


Yale  College,  Oct.,  1871. 


/"COL.COLL. 

IJRR\Px\ 

\     N.YOKK. 


Km.-.^  .^i-.^,,.^^- 


THE 


Sciences  of  Nature 

VERSUS  THE 

Science  of  Man. 


-•^♦- 


NOT  many  days  ago,  as  I  strayed  into  the 
study  of  an  eminent  physicist,  I  observed  hang- 
ing against  the  wall,  framed  like  a  choice  en- 
graving, several  dingy,  ribbon-like  strips  of,  I 
knew  not  what,  arranged  in  parallel  rows. 
My  curiosity  was  at  once  aroused.  What  were 
they?  and  why  were  they  so  carefully  protected 
and  so  greatly  honored  by  my  realistic  friend  ? 
They  might  be  shreds  of  mummy-wraps  orbits 
of  friable  bark-cloth  from  the  Pacific,  and  there- 


8 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


fore  needing  to  be  guarded  under  glass  ;    or 
perhaps,  indeed,  they  were  remnants  from  a 
grandmother's  wedding  dress ;  or  shoe-ties,  out 
of  which  all  color  had  faded,  leaving  a  faint 
shimmer  of  satin  finish  on  the  water-stained 
surface.     They  were  none  of  these  ;  to  have 
suggested  any  of  which  might  have  been  re- 
sented by  the  grave  philosopher,  who  solidly 
explained    that   they  were   carefully-prepared 
photographs  of  portions  of  the  Solar  Spectrum. 
I  stood  and  mused,  absorbed  in  the  varying 
yet  significant  intensities  of  light  and  shade, 
bordered  by  mystic  letters  and  symbolic  num- 
bers.  As  I  mused,  the  pale  legend  began  to  glow 
with  life.     Every  line  became  luminous  with 
meaning.  Every  shadow  was  suffused  with  light 
shining  from  behind,  suggesting  some  mighty 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


9 


achievement  of  knowledge;  of  knowledge 
growing  more  daring  in  proportion  to  the  re- 
moteness of  the  object  known  ;  of  knowledge 
becoming  more  positive  in  its  answers,  as  the 
questions  which  were  asked  seemed  unanswer- 
able.  No  Runic  legend,  no  Babylonish  arrow- 
head, no  Egyptian  hieroglyph,  no  Moabite 
stone,  could  present  a  history  like  this,  or  sug- 
gest thoughts  of  such  weighty  import  or  so 
stimulate  and  exalt  the  imagination. 

Over  against  these  symbolic  bands — records 
of  light  by  means  of  the  light  and  glowing 
with  light  to  the  soul — hung  the  portrait  of 
Newton,  with  its  wondrous  forehead  and  eagle 
glance.  I  turned  from  the  spectrum  to  the 
portrait  and  from  the  portrait  to  the  spectrum, 
still  musing  as   I   turned.     Newton's   daring 


10 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


suggestion,'*  that  the  force,  familiarly  recogniz- 
ed on  the  earth,  might  prevail  as  far  as  the  moon 
and  possibly  extend  to  the  sun — coming  like 
inspiration,  but  held  in  abeyance  for  years,  till 
careful  and  long-delayed  measurements  made  it 
spring  into  an  acknowledged  fact,  this  came 
to  mind  as  it  had  never  done  before.  With 
it  the  successive  experiments  of  Newton  upon 
the  light — his  expansion  of  the  colorless  beam 
into  the  gay  and  many-colored  spectrum,  sug- 
gesting theories  of  rays  and  undulations  and 


♦  "  As  he  sat  alone  in  a  garden,  [166fi,]  he  fell  Into  a  ppcculation  on 
the  power  of  gravity ;  that  as  this  power  is  not  found  Bcneiblj  dimin- 
ished ftt  the  remotest  distance  from  the  centre  of  the  earth  to  which  we 
can  rise,  neither  at  the  tops  of  the  loftiest  buildings,  nor  even  on  the 
Bunnnitsof  the  highest  mountains,  it  appeared  to  him  reasonable  to 
conclude  that  this  power  must  extend  much  further  than  was  usually 
thought :  why  not  as  high  as  the  moon  ?  said  he  to  himself ;  and  if  so, 
her  motion  must  be  influenced  by  it ;  perhaps  she  is  retained  in  her 
orbit  thereby."— Whewkll,  Hist,  qf  the  Ind.  Sciences,  vol.1,  b.  vli., 
ch.  li.,  §  3." 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


II 


mystic  powers   in   the   several  colors.     There 
followed  the  thought  of  Wollaston  and  Young 
and  of  Fraunhofer,and  his  discovery  of  the  lines 
that   were  afterwards  to  be  interpreted  as  a 
language  from  far-off  worlds.    But,  first,  chem- 
istry must  come  into  being,  to  evolve  the  gases 
and  decompose  the  solids,  that  it  might  use 
the  refracted  light  to  determine  the  elements 
of  that  which  is  consumed  in  the  light-giving 
flame.     Each  one  of  these  steps  of  progress  in- 
volved bold  invention  and  exact  observation. 
But    each    was    necessary   to   this    proudest 
achievement  of  our  times,  by  which  the  scientist 
has  connected  the  sun  and  the  earth  by  the 
closest  affinities,  and  interpreted  the  structure 
of  the  orb  which  for  centuries  had  smitten  with 
blindness  the  eye  that  had  ventured  to  gaze 


12 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


familiarly  upon  its  face,  and  has  even  resolved 
the  nebulae  themselves  into  luminous  gases. 

I  exclaimed  in  thought :  "  Would  that  New- 
ton were  now  living,  and  could  look  with 
our  open  vision  upon  the  blinding  sun,  the 
glowing  stars  and  the  burning  nebulae  ! — those 
objects  which  science  first  made  so  remote  and 
now  brings  so  near — between  which  and  the 
eye  she  first  interposed  such  abysms  of  distance 
as  appall  the  imagination  and  at  last  made  so  fa- 
miliar and  so  near,  that  we  inspect  the  sodium  or 
the  hydrogen  that  burns  in  the  lamp  upon  our 
table,  with  the  same  look  with  which  we  watch 
the  sodium  and  the  hydrogen  that  have  been 
consuming  for  ages  in  the  sun  or  the  stars.  Of 
all  the  kings  and  prophets  of  science,  surely 
Newton  would  most  have  desired  to  sec  the 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


13 


things  which  we  see  and  to  hear  the  things 
which  we  hear :  Would,  indeed,  that  he  could 
live  again  and  witness  the  completion  of  the 
work  which  he  so  nobly  began !  " 

I  awake  from  my  musing,  and,  abjuring  any 
scepticism  which  I  may  have  cherished,  I 
confess  my  faith  in  modern  science.  Though 
hard-hearted  as  any  metaphysician  ought  to 
be,  I  prostrate  myself  before  her  shrine — nay, 
so  ardent  is  my  neophytic  zeal,  that  I  am 
tempted  to  glorify  the  photographic  spectrum 
into  a  fetich.  Indeed,  had  I  nothing  else  to 
reverence,  I  could  easily  worship  this. 

I  returned  to  my  studies  a  wiser,  perhaps 
a  sadder  man.  To  refresh  and  assure  my  be- 
wildered spirit  I  think  of  Socrates.  Turning  to 
the  Memorabilia  of  Xenophon,  I  find  I  was 


14 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NxVTURE 


not  mistaken  in  my  memory,  for  it  is  there  set 
down  to  the  credit  of  the  philosopher,  that  *'  he 
never  discoursed  concerning  the  nature  of  all 
things,  how  that  which  the  Sophists  call  the  uni- 
iverse,  o  Hoapio?  is  constituted,  under  what  laws 
the  heavenly  bodies  exist,  etc.,  but  invariably 
represented  those  who  concerned  themselves 
with  inquiries    of  this  sort  as  playing  the  fool. 
First  of  all  he  inquired  whether  such  persons 
thought  they  had  so   far  mastered  the   facts 
which  relate  to  man  as  to  be  justified  in  pro- 
ceeding  to   such    investigations,  or   whether 
they  considered  it  in  order  to  leave  human  in- 
quiries for  physical  researches."*  Thus  records 
Xenophon  concerning  Socrates.     Poor  deluded 
son  of  Sophroniscus!     For   such  sentiments, 

♦  Xm.  Mem.,  Lib.  I.  Cap.  T.  H-IO, 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


15 


the  present  times  would  be  more  against  thee 
than  were  thine  own,  hard  as  they  were  !  Even 
the  defence  of  atheism  would  not  have  saved 
thee  again.st  so  enormous  a  heresy  respecting 
the  sciences  of  nature.  Had  a  society  of 
modern  scientists  sat  in  judgment  upon  thee, 
they  for  once  would  have  been  unanimous  and 
voted  thee  worthy  of  death.  Certainly  Hiou 
wouldst  have  had  a  smaller  minority  than  thou 
hadst  in  ancient  Athens,  in  any  modern  scien- 
tific association,  whether  it  were  a  society  for 
mutual  admiration  or  for  reciprocal  alterca- 
tion. For  is  it  not  now  an  exploded  idea  that 
man,  or  what  concerns  him,  is  better  worth  re- 
garding, than  what  was  called  nature  by  the 
sophists  in  the  time  of  Socrates?  Is  not  man 
himself  now  in  danger  of  being  eliminated  out 


i6 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


of  the  kosmos?  And  as  to  holding  that  man 
has  any  great  significance  in  the  universe, 
has  not  the  doctrine  become  fixed  that 
science  has  to  do  only  with  phenomena,  /".  e,, 
with  material  phenomena  and  their  relations  ? 
Has  not  man  been  satisfactorily  resolved 
into  nerve-substance  and  vibrating  force,  and 
thus  brought  under  the  laws  of  mechanism? 
And  has  it  not  come  to  unconscious  speech  with- 
out even  the  suggestion  of  unconscious  irony, 
that  this  is  the  only  way  in  which  man  can  be 
scientifically  studied,  even  though  by  this  pro- 
cess he  is  scientifically  disposed  of?  Is  it  not 
now  near  being  demonstrated,  that  man  as  body 
and  spirit,  as  conscience  and  speech,  has  been 
evolved  from  lower  forms  of  being,  with  all 
his  furnishings  of  aspirations,  categories  and 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


17 


principles ;  and  is  it  not  also  a  matter  of  grave 
question,  whether  he  can  long  remain  in  his 
present  transition  state — whether,  having  been 
evolved  from  some  very  indeterminate  germ, 
he  may  not  be  evolved  into  something  alto- 
gether impalpable?  In  short,  is  not  man 
ranked  very  low  in  the  present  estimates  of 
comparative  science,  and  is  he  not  in  danger  of 
being  very  soon  left  out  of  them  altogether? 

Somewhat  after  this  fashion  ran  our  med- 
itations respecting  nature  and  man;  according 
to  which  the  two  are  brought  into  sharp  an- 
tagonism as  objects  of  certain  and  trustworthy 
knowledge,  and  as  claiming  attention  from 
the  modern  philosopher  and  educator.  Al- 
ready in  the  departments  of  study  and 
of    education,    an     active    controversy    has 


i8 


THE   SCIENXES  OF  NATURE 


sprung  up  which  threatens  to  bring  on  a 
sharp  litigation,  in  which  the  parties  are  to  be 
the  Sciences  of  Nature  and  the  Science  of 
Man.  At  present  the  odds  arc  largely 
against  man,  and  we  fear  that  soon  it  may  be 
claimed  that  man  has  no  rights  which  the 
student  of  nature  is  bound  to  respect ;  that  if 
science  requires  it,  man  must  go  to  the  wall. 
There  is  no  telling  how  soon  he  may  be 
summoned  to  allow  himself  quietly  to  be 
shoved  out  of  being  under  the  operation  of 
natural  selection,  or  to  be  sublimated  into 
some  sort  of  impalpable  incense  upon  the 
altar  of  scientific  progress. 

Under  these  unequal  odds  I  bring  to  this 
ancient     and     honorable     Philosophical     So- 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE  OF   MAN. 


19 


ciety  * — a  society  which  originated  when 
philosophy  had  another  meaning  than  is 
claimed  for  it  at  present — a  plea  for  the  science 
of  man ;  not  as  against  the  sciences  of  na- 
ture to  whose  claims  I  have  already  confessed 
my  allegiance,  but  as  essential  to  these  sciences, 
and  as,  therefore,  incapable  of  being  ever 
superseded,  or  set  aside,  or  left  behind  in 
their  most  splendid  achievements.  I  would 
even  be  so  audacious  as  to  seek  to  show  that 
in  all  these  man  must  be  a  constant  quantity, 
and  that  the  elements  which  he  furnishes  can 
never  be  dispensed  with ;  that,  as  the  sciences 
of  nature  make  progress,  these  elements  will 
come  more  and  more  distinctly  into  recog- 
nition; that  as   Nature   is    more    profoundly 

*  Of  the  ^.  B.  K.  of  Harvard  and  Trinity. 


20 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


21 


studied,  the  results  of  this  study  will  bring 
Man's  capacities  and  endowments  more  dis- 
tinctly into  view.  I  would  demonstrate 
that  man  must  be  thoroughly  understood 
and  nobly  confided  in,  if  nature  is  to  be  inter- 
preted in  its  widest  relations,  and  our  con- 
fidence in  the  principles  and  laws  which  are 
essential  to  the  science  of  nature  is  to  be 
surely  established.  I  offer  this  plea  not  in 
the  interests  of  strife,  but  in  the  interests  ot 
peace  ;  not  to  gain  a  one-sided  victory,  but  to 
show  that  no  action  can  hold  between  the  two 
parties,  because  thfe  sciences  of  nature  and  of 
man  can  never  be  at  variance.  I  would  also  show 
that  as  there  can  be  no  science  of  nature  which 
does  not  recognize  the  science  of  man,  and  as 
the  study  of  nature  cannot  be  prosecuted  to 


the  neglect  of  man,  so  the  study  of  man  will 
be  always  furthered  by  a  generous  study  of 
nature ;  that  as  on  the  broader  field  of  invest- 
igation and  culture,  so  on  the  narrower  field  of 
education  and  discipline,  the  scientific  study  of 
nature  and  the  scientific  study  of  man  are 
mutually  dependent  and  mutually  helpful. 


We  enforce  our  argument  first  of  all  by  an 
analysis  of  the  conception  of  science.  What 
science  is,  is  not  so  easily  stated  as  would 
seem  likely  from  the  freedom  with  which  the 
term  is  used,  or  the  readiness,  not  to  say  the 
flippancy,  with  which  its  authority  is  enforced. 
The  most  cautious  scientist  would  doubtless 
concede  that  nature  furnishes  the  materials  and 
viari  arranges  them  ;    more    exactly,  the   ob- 


r 


22 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


23 


serving   man  collects  facts,  and  the  reflecting 
man  explains  facts.     We  speak  freely  of  the 
careless  glance  of  the  one  and  the  sagacious 
insight  of  the  other.     We  talk  of  the  secrets 
which   nature   has   been   carefully  hiding   for 
generations,  and  has  been  reluctantly  forced  to 
yield   at  the  bidding  of    one  who   had  over- 
heard the  charmed  words  at  which  the  doors 
of  her  treasure-house  must  fly  open.    If  we  are 
sufficiently   curious   to   ask    what    science    is, 
every  answer  which  we   give  must   carry  us 
back  to  man  as  an  agent  who  thinks  natural 
facts    into    scientific    theories,   who    explains 
phenomena   by   laws,  and  founds  systems   on 
principles.     This  question,  it   is  true,  may  be 
curious  rather  than  useful.     It  were  too  much 
to  expect  that    Newton  should  pause  in  the 


tremulous  suggestion  that  first  connected  the 
detention  of  the  revolving  moon  with  the 
force  that  brings  down  the  falling  stone,  in 
order  to  ask  whence  the  suggestion  was  in- 
spired and  how  it  could  be  justified ;  or  that 
the  ardent  Davy  should  have  held  back  from 
the  brave  experiment  that  literally  unearthed 
the  bounding  potassium,  in  order  to  perfect 
a  metaphysical  analysis  of  the  processes  which 
discovered  or  the  reasons  which  foretold  it,* 
or  that  Kirchhoff  should  have  been  diverted 


*  For  the  (lotails  of  tliii^  (liifcovery  and  experiment,  see  Life  of 
Sir  Humphrey  Diiv'v,  Chap.  III.  We  quote  the  following;  "I  Lave 
been  toll  by  Mr.  Edmund  Davy,  his*  relative  and  then  assistant  .  . 
that  when  he  [Sir  numphrey]  saw  the  minute  jflobulci?  of  potassinm 
burst  throujfh  the  cruh't  of  potash,  and  take  fire  as  they  entered  the 
atnv)8pherc,  he  ctmld  not  contain  his  joy — he  actually  bounded 
about  the  room  in  ecstatic  delight;  and  that  some  little  time  was 
required  for  him  to  compose  himself  sufficiently  to  continue  the 
experiments.'' 


24 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


25 


from  the  daring  gaze  by  which  he  would  read 
the  secret  of  the  sun  in  order  to  interpret 
the  thoughts  which  emboldened  him  to  the 
effort.  But  how  is  it  after  a  discovery  has 
been  made,  or  a  great  secret  of  nature  has 
been  mastered  ?  Then  not  only  curiosity  turns 
from  the  result  to  the  process  by  which  it  has 
been  achieved  ;  but  the  anxiety  to  make  sure 
that  the  jewel  wrested  from  nature  has  been 
lawfully  obtained  and  may  be  safely  held, 
impels  to  the  earnest  inquiry  whether  the 
charm  by  which  we  won  it  was  whispered  us 
in  our  ear  byt  he  honest  spirit  of  nature,  or 
by  some  mischief-loving  imp  of  the  mocking 
phantasy.  So  it  happens  that  long  after 
Newton*s  discovery  has  become  a  common- 
place to  the  school-boy,  and  Davy's  experiment 


is  repeated  every  day  by  the  shop-lad,  and  the  re- 
velations of  the  spectrum-analysis  have  enabled 
the  novice  glibly  to  discourse  of  the  secrets 
of  the  sun,  that  then  the  true  and  earnest 
philosopher  carefully  retraces  the  path  which 
has  conducted  science  to  the  dizzy  heights  on 
which  she  stands,  and  tremblingly  inquires. 
How  came  I  hither?  Is  the  standing  ground 
firm?  Are  the  objects  which  I  seem  to  see 
the  firm  and  solid  land,  or  only  a  delusive 
mirage  ? 

Now,  if  we  ask  these  questions,  we  must 
answer  them ;  and  if  we  answer  them,  as  we 
contend,  we  must  study  the  nature  of  man. 
We  cannot  justify  the  processes  by  which  we 
interpret  nature,  unless  we  scrutinize  the 
processes  of  the  human  spirit  which  performs 


26 


THE   SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


27 


them,    and   search    after    the   principles  and 
faiths  which  these  processes  assume  and  rest 
upon.    We  cannot  discover  and  vindicate  the 
^rounds  on  which  our  inquiries  rest,  without 
findinir    them    imbedded   in   man*s   being   as 
axioms  and  principles  which,  as  the  result  of 
further  scrutiny,  we  find  that  he  can  neither 
question  nor  set  aside.     The  foundations  of  the 
science  of  nature  in  the  last  analysis  are  dis- 
covered in  the  ineradicable  beliefs  and  convic- 
tions of  the  human  spirit,  and  it  is  only  by  the 
earnest  and  careful  study  of  this  spirit  that  we 
can  find  them,  and,  having  found  them,  can 
recognize  them  as  the  principles  by  which  we 
interpret  both  nature  and  man. 

Were   we    to   proceed    further    in    the   an- 
alysis of  science,  we  should  add  that  science 


objectively  viewed  is  universally  conceived  as 
related  knozvledge.  Those  who  limit  it  most 
narrowly,  assert  Ihat  it  gives  us  phenomena 
connected  by  relations.  But  facts  or  pheno- 
mena do  not  connect  themselves.  To  con- 
ceive that  they  do  or  can,  were  to  fall  into  the 
worst  and  emptiest  trick  of  personifying  an 
abstraction,  against  which  this  class  of  philoso- 
phers are  the  most  earnest  in  their  cautions. 
They  require  an  agent  to  do  this  work,  and 
to  do  it,  not  after  the  caprices  of  an  infant's 
or  an  idiot's  handling,  but  by  wise  and  intel- 
ligent combinations.  Whence  do  these  rela- 
tions— these  mystic  bonds  of  science — pro- 
ceed ?  The  interpreting  mind  does,  in  some 
sense,  find  them  already  in  its'hands.  Whether 
they  are  evolved    from    its    own   experience 


28 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


as  the  progressive  acquisitions  of  associa- 
tion, that  cannot  be  broken,  as  Mill,  Bain,  and 
Spencer  would  teach  us  ;  whether  like  a  mystic 
veil,  they  are  thrown  over  the  otherwise 
chaotic  phenomena  of  both  matter  and  spirit 
by  the  formative  energy  of  man,  as  Kant  con- 
fidently suggests  ;  or  whether  they  are  at  once 
the  conditions  of  thought  to  man,  because 
they  are  conditions  of  being  in  nature  and 
God,  as  the  wit  of  common  sense  and  the  re- 
search of  the  profoundest  philosophy  declare, 
these  relations  must,  in  the  study  of  nature,  be 
confidingly  applied  by  man  as  fast  and  as  far 
as  the  chaos  which  bewilders  the  infant  and 
overaws  the  savage,  is  thought  into  a  cosmos 
by  man's  interpreting  reason.  If  the  in- 
ductive  sciences   claim   allegiance   from    the 


vs.  THE   SCIENCE   OF  MAN. 


29 


common  sense  of  mankind,  the  inductive 
method  must  be  justified  to  its  most  critical,  and 
even  its  sceptical  analysis.  But  the  inductive 
method  can  in  no  way  be  justified,  except  as 
the  intellect  falls  back  upon  its  own  underly- 
ing faiths  concerning  God  and  nature.  Brief- 
ly, an  inductive  science  of  nature  presupposes  a 
sciettce  of  induction,  and  a  science  of  induction 
presupposes  a  science  of  man. 

We  urge  still  further  that  the  history  of  the 
sciences  ^y  nature  illustrates  their  near  re- 
lation to  the  science  of  man.  Before  Socrates, 
the  physics  were  as  crude  as  the  metaphys- 
ics. Both  alike  were  raw  guess-work, 
founded  on  hasty  resemblances  more  rude- 
ly interpreted  and  generalized.  From  such 
speculations      about      matter      and      spirit 


30 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


Socrates  wisely  withdrew  his  thoughts,    that 
he   might   first   understand   himself  as   near- 
er and  more  intelligible  to  himself  than  nature. 
But  in  learning  how  to  study  himself,  he  also 
learned    the  secret  of  knowincr   other  thintrs. 
If  we  may  trust  the  brief  expositions  of  Xcno- 
phon,  and  the  embellished  dialogues  of  Plato, 
he  learned  the  rules  of  cautious  observation, 
wise  definition,  and  comprehensive  comparison, 
and  rigidly  enforced  them  as  the  conditions  of 
all    trustworthy    knowledge.       The    Socratic 
method  was  first  applied  by  him  to  man,  and 
what     concerns    man;    but   the    disciples   of 
Socrates,  having  learned  the  secret  of  wise  ob- 
servation,  could  not  but  apply   it   to  nature 
forthwith ;  and  out  of  this  Socratic  school  came 
the   ambitious  cosmogony  of  Plato,  the  per- 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


31 


fected  logic,  and  the  sober  and  in  many  respects 
solid  physics  of  Aristotle,  with  the  beginnings  of 
that  geometry  which  soon  was  so  nearly  per- 
fected as  not  to  be  disdained  hy  Newton  and 
La  Place, — the  geometry  which  the  modern 
schools  that  are  most  jealous  of  the  study  of 
man,  rightly  and  earnestly  insist  on  as  the  only 
condition  of  science,  writing  over  their  portals  as 
Plato  did,  "  Let  no  one  enter  here  who  cannot 


:«z,  »♦ 


geometrize. 

As  we  trace  the  beginnings  of  modern 
physics,  we  find  that  the  true  method  of  inter- 
preting nature  was  sought  for  by  Bacon  and 
Descartes  in  the  nature  of  man,  by  the  first 
impliedly  and  yet  abundantly,  by  the  second 
confessedly  and  formally.  The  present  cen- 
tury, so  distinguished   for   the    achievements 


32 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


of  physics,  numbers  not  a  few  among  the  most 
successful  students  of  nature  whose  attention 
has  been  given  to  the  scrutiny  of  the  methods 
of  science  itself.  We  name  Davy,  Herschel, 
Whewell,  Agassiz,  Faraday  and  Tyndall, 
all  of  whom  have  judged  the  science  of  induc- 
tion to  be  the  most  fundamental,  the  most 
wide-reaching  and  fascinating  of  sciences. 
Not  a  few,  like  Davy,  have  combined  poetic 
and  metaphysical  tastes,  with  a  genius  for 
physics.  We  may  say  almost  universally  that 
men  great  in  discovery  and  profound  in 
philosophic  research,  have  always  been  forward 
to  recognize  that  man  must  furnish  the 
key  to  the  mysteries  of  nature,  he  himself 
being  the  greatest  mystery  of  all.  There 
have  been    many    so-called    physicists    who 


» 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


33 


were  content  to  find  or  take  their  for- 
mulae and  principles  at  second  hand,  and  work 
them  out  in  problems  and  experiments, 
many  who  have  hastily  borrowed  or  stolen 
them  from  some  crude  and  effete  meta- 
physics, but  never  was  there  a  philosopher  of 
nature  who  looked  for  a  theory  of  his  science, 
who  did  not  believe  in  a  science  of  man. 


Our  position  is  still  further  confirmed  by 
the  defects  in  this  regard  of  some  oi  the  recent 
philosophies  "whxch.  are  now  attracting  general 
attention.  These  philosophies  have  these 
features  in  common  :  they  all  claim  to  be  con- 
structed in  the  spirit  of  the  inductive  method, 
and  after  the  analogies  of  modern  physics, 
and  to  be   justified    by    actual    experiment. 


34 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


35 


But  they  all  can  be  shown  to  be  seriously  de- 
fective, for  the  reason  that  their  science  of 
man  is  too  narrow  or  erroneous  to  furnish  a 
solid  basis  for  any  science  of  nature  whatever. 


We  begin  with  the  philosophy  which  is  now 
in  the  mouth  of  every  man,  the  so-called 
Positive  Philosophy  ;  and  to  be  both  discriminat- 
ing and  just,  we  will  first  notice  it  in  that 
form  in  which  it  was  taught  by  its  original 
expounder.  The  fundamental  doctrines  of 
Comte  and  the  characteristics  of  the  Positive 
Philosophy,  are  thus  summed  up  by  Mill  : 
**  We  have  no  knowledge  of  anything  but 
phenomena ;  (and  our  knowledge  of  phenom- 
ena is  relative  not  absolute.)  We  know  not 
the  essence  nor  the  real  mode  of  production 


>l^ 


;  J' 


I 


of  any  fact,  but  only  its  relations  to  other 
facts  in  the  way  of  succession,  or  of  similitude. 
These  relations  are  constant,  that  is,  always 
the  same  in  the  same  circumstances.  The 
constant  resemblances  which  link  phenomena 
together  and  the  constant  sequences  which 
unite  them  as  antecedent  and  consequent, 
arc  termed  their  laws.  The  laws  of  phenom- 
ena are  all  we  know  respecting  them.  Their 
essential  nature,  and  their  ultimate  causes, 
either  efficient  or  final,  are  unknown  and  in- 
scrutable to  us."  *  Of  this  Positive  Philoso- 
phy, as  thus  expounded,  we  observe  that  it 
is  properly  if  not  emphatically  metaphysical. 
Against   this   charge  Comte   would  earnestly 


•  J.  S.  Mill,  the  PoBitive  Philogophy  of  Comte,  pp.  7  and  8.    Am. 


Ed. 


36 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


protest  in  the  words,  "  Have  I  not  demon- 
strated by  a  broad  and  decisive  induction 
that  the  human  mind  must  have  passed 
through  the  stages  of  theology  and  metaphysics 
before  it  could  reach  the  apotheosis  of  positiv- 
ism? If  this  induction  is  good,  I  cannot  be 
remanded  to  the  condition  which  I  have  already 
outgrown.**  We  do  not  care  to  question 
whether  this  historic  induction  of  Comte  is 
correct,  concerning  which  his  own  adherents 
hold  diverse  opinions,  nor  do  we  urge  that  he 
has  no  right,  according  to  his  fundamental 
principles,  to  make  any  historic  induction  at 
all ;  we  simply  assert  the  fact  that  the  positive 
philosophy  is  a  metaphysical  phenomenon.  To 
urge  that  it  cannot  be,  because  it  does  not 
occur  in  the  right  order  of  time,  is   to  urge 


If 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


37 


that  a  patient  cannot  have  scarlet  fever  or  the 
measles,  because  the  same  patient,  accord- 
ing to  the  theory  of  these  diseases,  can  have 
neither  a  second  time.  It  is,  to  apply  the 
a  priori  method,  to  set  aside  a  positive 
phenomenon  or  fact.  That  the  positive  phi- 
losophy is  metaphysical,  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  term,  is  too  obvious  to  admit  of  question. 
Its  problan  is  metaphysical.  It  proposes  not 
only  to  discover  the  criteria  of  the  processes 
which  are  common  to  all  the  special  sciences, 
but  it  sets  these  forth  as  the  criteria  of  every 
true  science.  Its  method  is  metaphysical  in  so 
far  as  it  passes  each  of  these  sciences  in  review, 
and  reapplies  these  principles  to  each  for  its 
subsequent  reconstruction  and  correction. 
Like  every  other  metaphysical  system,  it  con- 


38 


THE  SCIENXES  OF  NATURE 


VS.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


39 


cerns  itself  with  relations.  But  constant  rela- 
tions are  what  in  all  systems  exalt  observed 
phenomena  to  the  dignity  of  science.  Other 
systems  recognize  more  relations— those  of 
causation  or  force— mayhap  those  of  design. 
Comte*s  metaphysics  hold  to  fewer,  those  of 
sequence  and  similitude.  To  use  a  figure  of 
clothing,  while  other  systems  honor,  by  recog- 
nition and  use,  the  habiliments  which  obvious 
necessity  and  universal  usage  have  sanctioned, 
this  sect  appear  among  the  sans  culottes  of 
philosophers,  on  the  principle  that  the  fewer 
clothes  we  have,  the  nearer  we  come  to  naked 
truth,  and  the  less  occasion  we  have  to  look 
after  our  clothes,  or  the  less  we  are  tempted 
to  think  more  of  the  clothes  than  of  tht:  man. 
Mill,  indeed,  while  he   concedes  (p.  8)  that 


(i 


Comte,  without  knowing  it,  accepted  and 
sought  to  solve  the  problem  of  metaphysics, 
contends  that  he  rightly  defined  and  avoided 
metaphysics,  in  the  technical  sense  of  the  habit 
of"  conceiving  of  mental  abstractions  as  real  en- 
tities, which  could  exert  power,  and  produce 
phenomena,  etc.  "  That  this  tendency  to  hy- 
postasize  abstractions  into  real  agencies  has 
prevailed  in  all  ages,  we  admit ;  that  Comte  and 
Comte's  disciples  have  not  escaped  its  influ- 
ence, it  would  be  easy  to  show.  No  class  of 
reasoners  seem  to  exemplify  it  more  emi- 
nently. Every  question  which  you  ask  them 
beyond  the  charmed  circle  of  the  formulae 
which  the  master  magician  has  drawn  around 
them  by  wand  and  charm,  is  answered  by 
the  stereotype  phrasci;  of  sequence  and  sim- 


40 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


41 


ilitude,  till  it  would  seem  as  though  these 
relations  had  become  personified  into  the 
living  forces  on  which  the  universe  depends 
for  its  existence  and  ordering. 

But  all  this  is  by  the  way :  the  only  point 
which  we  care  to  urge  against  Comte,  is  that  he 
does  not  recognize  the  presence  and  the 
agency  of  man ;  that  he  attempts  to  furnish  a 
philosophy  of  science  which  leaves  entirely 
out  of  view  the  prime  element  in  science,  the 
nature  of  knowledge  as  explained  by  the 
nature  of  men  as  qualified  to  know.  Man 
is  not  recognized  by  Comte  *  as  such  a  be- 
ing at  all,  but  only  as  a  mass  of  nervous 
substance,  incased   in  a    material    shell,    the 

♦  The  IhHtive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,  translated  by  Harriet 
Martineap.  Book  V,  Chapter  VII. 


m. 


i\\ 


functions  of  which,  so  far  as  they  are  deemed 
worthy  of  notice,  are  simply  physiological, 
with  the  added  capacity  to  expand  or  modify 
the  incasing  skull.  Even  the  poor  compliment 
is  not  formally  paid  to  this  nervous  substance 
of  being  able  to  respond  to  the  relations  of  se- 
quence and  similitude  in  material  phenomena. 
Much  less  is  it  honestly  conceded,  what  Comte*s 
own  system  requires,  that  this  mass  has  the  ad- 
ditional power  to  observe  the  relations  of  con- 
stant sequence  and  similitude  between  its  own 
material  condition  and  any  one  of  these  acts 
of  response  or  observation.  All  this  is  over- 
looked, and  superficially  huddled  away  into 
the  general  statement  that  what  are  called 
psychological  processes,  are  properly  included 
under  biological  phenomena ;  and  this  by  the 


42 


THE   SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


man  who  claims  for  the  functions  of  his  own 
brain,  the  magic  power  to  discover  the  follies 
of  all  the  preceding  philosophies,  and  to  pre- 
vent all  error  in  succeeding  ages  !  Man,  as 
treated  by  Comte,  is  not  even  cavalierly  bowed 
out  from  the  ivory  gate  of  this  palace  of  mag- 
nificent pretensions,  but  the  door  is  contempt- 
uously and  violen'rly  thrust  in  his  face ;  and 
then,  inasmuch  as  there  can  be  no  science  and 
no  philosophy  of  science,  in  which  the  presence 
of  man  must  not  somehow  be  implied,  he  is 
smuggled  in  by  the  meanest  of  the  servants 
through  the  narrowest  postern  that  was  ever 
devised. 

Much  may  be  truly  said  in  praise  of  Comte 
and  the  positive  philosophy.  The  daring  of 
his  problem,  his  exact  and  manifold  knowl- 


i 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


43 


\ 


fli 


1 1  i 


\:v. 


edge  of  the  special  sciences,  the  breadth  of  his 
generalizations,  especially  in  mathematics  and 
physics,  the  cool  severity  of  his  stony-eyed 
criticism,  all  these  deserve  the  highest  com- 
mendation. But  the  naive  and  narrow  sim--^ 
plicity  which  leaves  out  of  sight  man  or 
the  knowing  agent,  in  a  philosophy  of  knowl- 
ed2fe,  and  the  unconscious  innocence  of  his 
metaphysical  abnegation  of  metaphysics  should 
claim  no  man's  admiration.  The  student  of 
nature,  or  of  history,  who  is  content  with  a 
formula  to  work  by,  may  be  satisfied  with  the 
positive  philosophy,  but  any  one  who  looks 
for  a  well-rounded  theory  of  all  human  knowl- 
edge, and  a  comprehensive  statement  of  the 
axioms  and  the  principles  w^hich  it  involves, 
cannot    but   be    disappointed    with    Comte's 


\'\ 


•  ( 


44 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


45 


teachings,  and  reject   him   as   a   trustworthy 
expounder  of  Philosophy. 

yo/in  Stttart  Mill,  the  follower,  yet  critic 
of  Comte,  has  distinctly  recognized  some  of 
his  defects,  and  has  attempted  to  supply 
them.  But  he  has  failed  in  four  essential  par- 
ticulars. He  has  neither  given  a  satisfactory 
theory  of  the  mind,  nor  of  matter,  nor  of  the 
process,  nor  of  the  axiom  sof  induction  itself. 
Though  he  contends  most  stoutly  for  the  legiti- 
macy of  psychological  observation,  and  the 
necessity  of  a  correct  theory  of  the  soul  as 
fundamental  to  induction,  he  provides  no  such 
theory ;  as  how  could  he,  if  he  limits  this  sci- 
ence, after  the  dictum  of  his  master,  to 
phenomena  and  the  relations  of  sequence  and 


similitude  ?  The  knowing  agent  that  must  not 
only  build  up  science,  but  provide  its  founda- 
tion principles.  Mill  resolves  into  succes- 
sive states  of  consciousness ;  he  even  calls 
these  feelings,  which  are  wrought  by  we  know 
not  what.  He  defines  the  agent  that  believes 
in  the  spectroscope,  and  is  not  dazed  by  the 
sun,  "  as  a  Series  of  Feelings  with  a  background 
of  possibilities  of  feeling.***  We  do  not  stay 
to  inquire  what  the  word  background  can 
mean,  unless  it  be  the  knowing  ego  fa- 
miliar to  common  sense  and  not  unneces- 
sary to  philosophy,  which  is  smuggled 
in  through  the  back-door  of  a  vaguely  meta- 
•    phorical  term ;    nor  whether  possibilitus  does 


«  Examination  qf  Sir  WilUam    Hamillon's  PAUofopAy,    Chapter 
zU. 


i 


46 


THE   SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


not  involve,  while  it  seems  to  hide  the  rela- 
tion of  causation  or  force,  against  which  Mill 
protests.  We  only  observe  that  it  is  more 
creditable  to  the  candor  of  Mill  than  to  his 
acuteness,  that,  on  second  thought,  he  com- 
pletes this  definition  of  the  soul  by  calling  it 
also  "a  series  of  feelings  which  is  aware  of  it- 
self as  past  and  future."  *  Here  again  we 
have  another  example  of  this  subreption  by  a 
postern,  of  the  notions  of  the  soul  itself 
and  its  relations  to  time,  both  of  which 
had  formally  been  discharged  by  the  front 
passage  as  superfluous.  More  amazing 
still  is  it,  that  after  making  this  correction, 
he  recovers  his  sense  of  consistency,  or, 
rather,  demonstrates  his  own  insensibility  to 


7'S.  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAX. 


47 


the  absurdity  of  his  position,  by  confessing 
that  "we  are  reduced  to  the  alternative  of 
believing  that  the  mind  or  fj;v  is  something 
different  from  any  scries  of  feelings,  or  possi- 
bilities of  them,  or  of  accepting  the  paradox, 
that  something  which,  rx  hypothcsi,  is  but  a 
series  of  feelings  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a 
series. "•^'  Which  of  these  alternatives  docs  he 
embrace?  Does  he  adhere  to  the  one  construc- 
tion which  his  formal  definitions,  as  well  as 
the  whole  drift  of  his  philosophy  requires 
him  to  support,  or  docs  he  frankly  concede 
that  he  bch'evcs  in  a  mind  as  an  agent,  an  ex- 
isting being,  which  is  something  more  than  a 
series  of  feelings  ?  He  does  neither,  but  pro- 
ceeds   to  affirm  :    **  The  truth  is  that  we  arc 


•  mdem. 


♦  im<i. 


48 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


here  face  to  face  with  that  final  inexplicability, 
at  which  we  inevitably  arrive  when  we  reach  ul- 
timate facts/'*     But  why  not  accept  the  facts 
and   shape  one's  definitions    accordingly,    in- 
stead of  constructing  a  definition  of  the  soul, 
and  building  a  theory  of  induction  upon  it, 
which  must  be  split  upon  these  facts.   He  pre- 
fers   to   concede   his  failure  in  the   extorted 
acknowledgment,    "  I  do  not  profess   to    ac- 
count for  the  belief  in  mind."  f     We  had  not 
expected    such  a  confession  without   repent- 
ance, and,  what  is  worse,  without  a  sense  of 
the  need  of  repentance,  from  the  modern  law- 
giver  of    scientific   method ;    from    the    new 
Bacon,  who   has   codified   the   rules   for  the 

*Ibid, 
ti&W.    Bd  Land,  edition.    P.  8. 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


49 


inductive  study  of  nature ;  from  the  plausible 
and  pertinacious  antagonist  of  what  he  calls  d 
priori  metaphysics  ! 

Not  only  has  Mill  entirely  failed,  and  by  his 
own  confession,  to  provide  a  mind  which  can  in- 
terpret matter,  but  he  has  failed  as  signally  to 
provide  for  our  belief  in  matter,  or  the  universe 
of  nature,  which  man  is  to  interpret.  Though 
he  claims,  by  eminence,  to  be  the  philosopher 
of  things,*  though  he  denounces  with  a  slight 
disdain  those  \vho  prefer  thoughts  to  things, 
he  makes  no  provision  for  our  knowledge  of 
things,  or  our  belief  in  the  material  world. 
His  formal  definition  of  matter  (while  it  is 
vastly  more  vague  and  unsatisfactory)  is  as 
purely  idealistic  as  that  of  Berkeley  or  Collier, 

•  LogiCy  B.  i.,  0.  it 


so 


THE   SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


51 


Matter  he  defines  as  **  a  Permanent  Possibility 
of  Sensations."  *  He  concedes  that  this 
definition  would  satisfy  Berkeley,  and  that  in 
any  other  sense  than  this  he  does  not  believe 
in  matter.  He  did  not  seem  at  first  to  be 
aware  that  through  the  word  pcrmmicnt  time 
has  stealthily  crept  into  his  definition,  and 
that  possibility  is  not  too  narrow  to  let  in 
causation,  that  dreaded  metaphysical  entity. 
He  makes  a  fearful  nod,  when  he  says 
squarely,  **the  possibilities  are  conceived 
as  standing  to  the  actual  sensations  in  the 
relation  of  a  cause  to  its  effects  *  His 
assurance  culminates  when  he  refers  our  faith 
in  the  permanence  of  these  possibilities  to  the 


*  Exam.  etc.  Chap,  xi. 

*  Exam.  Chap.  xi. 


I 


assumption  that  sensations  similar  to  our  own 
are    experienced    from    material    objects   by 
other  beings.     "  The  world  of  possible  sensa- 
tions   succeeding     one     another,     according 
to    laws,    is    as    much    in    other    beings    as 
it  is  in   me;    it  has,  therefore^   an   existence 
outside   of  me,   it  is  an    external  world."* 
As   if  the   existence   of   other  beings,    with 
the  relations  of  outside  and  inside.,  were  not 
the  things   to   be   accounted   for,   and   as   if, 
through  the  door  opened  to  admit  this  item  of 
proof,  space  and  its  relations,  including  mat- 
ter, had  not  marched  boldly  in,  after  both  had 
been  formally    excluded,   till   they  could  be 
formally  introduced  by  a  philosophical  ticket 
of  leave ! 


52 


THE   SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


But  allowing  Mr.  Mill  to  believe  in  man  and 
nature,  as  much  or  as  little  as  he  will,  we  in- 
quire, with  greater  earnestness,  what  is  his  the- 
ory of  induction,  i.  e.,  how  does  he  explain  the 
process,  and  on  what  foundations  does  he  rest 
the  structure  ?  These  questions  are  somewhat 
important,  when  the  scientist  requires  me  to 
believe  in  the  spectroscope.      Especially  are 
they  important  in  the  view  of  the  neophyte, 
whose  faith  in  science  is  weak,  and  who  con- 
siders all  at  once  the  number  of  assumptions 
that  enter  into  the  result,— the  truth  of  gravita- 
tion, the  theory  of  light,  the  chemical  analysis 
by  light  of  burning  bodies    and  gases,  and, 
above  all,  when   he   takes  into  account  the 
enormous   distances,  and    the   subtle   indica- 
tions.     It  is  not  wonderful  that  he  asks  "  how 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


53 


and  why  is  it  that  I  am  justified  in  accepting 
this  wonderful  story,  as  enchanting,  if  it  be  not 
as  fabulous,  as  the  story  of  the  *'  Lamp  of  Al- 
addin?** Pray,  Mr.  Mill,  who  knowest  every 
word  and  syllable  of  the  magic  spell,  repeat  it 
to  me  letter  by  letter  and  word  by  word,  con- 
firm the  steps  of  my  tottering  faith,  trace  out 
for  me  the  subtle  and  narrow  path,  along 
which  the  philosopher  has  reached  the  stars, 
and  even  cast  himself  into  the  abyss  beyond. 

How  does  Mr.  Mill  answer  these  entreaties? 
"  Induction,  my  son,  in  philosophical  language, 
is  the  result  of  repeated  experiences  of  sensa- 
tions, so  closely  combined  as  to  have  become 
practically  inseparable.  We  learn  in  this  way 
to  make  the  familiar  and  the  near  to  represent 
the  unfrequent  and  remote,  according  to  cer- 


54 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


tain  axioms  and  principles,  concerning  the  uni- 
formities and  laws  of  nature,  and  the  relations 
of  time  and  space,  which  give   mathematical 
truths  and  relations."     "  But  whence  are  these 
ultimate  beliefs  derived  ?"     To  this  Mr.   Mill 
has  no  other  reply ;  ''  all  these  are  derived  from 
induction,  even    the  very  principles  that  are 
used  in   induction,  and  the  very  beliefs  that 
are  most  sacred  concerning  the  sequences  and 
similitudes  of  phenomena — these  all  are  the 
products  of  induction  ;  even  though  they  are 
the  conditions  of  induction;  and  all  come  from 
inseparable  associations."  "  Is  this  all  that  can 
be  said  of  them  ?     How  then  can  I  trust  them, 
supposing  I  have  not  yet  learned  to  associate 
these  things  together  ;  or  what  if  they  should  be 
differently  connected  in  other  minds?"  To  this 


vs.  THE   SCIENCE  OF   MAN. 


55 


he  would  reply,  ''  The  last  is  supposable ;  and 
the  consequence  would  be,  that  those  minds 
would  have  different  beliefs  conccrninirthe  laws 
of  nature,  and  even  concerning  the  fixedness  of 
any  laws  of  nature,  or  the  relations  of  number 
and  magnitude.  It  is  supposable  that  to  the 
inhabitants  of  another  planet,  the  inseparable 
associations  should  be  so  strangely  mixed  and 
readjusted,  that  they  should  multiply  ///nv 
and  /o?ir  into  eleven^  and  should  conceive,  that 
to  issue  ten  per  cent,  dividends  signifies  to  steal 
the  capital  ten  times  over.  Or  the  inhabitants 
of  another  might  be  trained  to  believe  that  two 
straight  lines  might  so  inclose  a  space,  that  a 
railway  charter  from  New  York  to  Erie  might 
be  mathematically  demonstrated  to  cover  all 
the    adjacent   territory   indefinitely   in    every 


56 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE, 


direetion.     But   to  correct  all  such  abuses,  he 
would  add,  **  you  can  use  experiments  and  they 
will  verify  all  correctly  joined  associations,  and 
expose  those  which  are  false."     But,  urges  the 
novice,  I  can  make  but  few  experiments,  and 
concerning  objects  of  limited  reach  ;  and  what 
I  am  required  to  believe  is  a  long  way  off.     I 
cannot  test  the  assertion  that  sodium  is  actu- 
ally burning  in  the  sun,  the  indications  are  so 
very  remote,  though  very  plausible.  I  can  burn 
the  sodium  in  my  lamp,  and  as  I  watch  the 
spectrum,  I  can  refract  another  spectrum  from 
the  sun  ;  but  how  shall  1  pass  from  what  is 
united  in  the  one  to  what  is  unknown  in  the 
other  ?     Nay,  how  do  I  know  that  what  you 
sometimes  call  causation  and  at  other  times  call 
sequence,  prevails   in  the  sun  at  all?     This 


rs.  THE  SCIENCE   OF  MAN. 


57 


question  is  so  important,  and  the  answer  so 
fundamental    to    the    neophyte's   faith,   that 
Mr.  Mill  would  probably  refer  him  to  chap- 
ter   and    verse    in    his  "  System   of  Logic," 
and  read  as  follows :  "  In  distant  parts  of  the 
stellar  regions,  where  the  phenomena  may  be 
entirely  unlike  those  with  which  we    are  ac- 
quainted,  it   would  be  folly   to  affirm  confi- 
dently that  this    general    law   of   causation 
prevails  any    more  than  those   special   ones, 
which  we  have  found  to  hold  universally  on 
our  own  planet.     The  uniformity  in  the  suc- 
cession of  events,  otherwise  called  the  law  of 
causation,  must  not  be  received  as  a  law  of  the 
universe,  but  of  that  portion  of  it  only  which 
is  within  the  range  of  our  means  of  sure  ob- 
servation, with  a  reasonable  degree  of  exten- 


S8 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


sion  to  adjacent  cases.     To  extend  it  further, 


is  to  make  a  supposition  without  evidence, 


»t 


etc.  *  "  But  if  all  this  is  so,  I  may  as  well  give 
up  my  faith  in  the  solar  spectrum.  Sodium 
burns  in  the  lamp,  and  its  flame  can  be  defined, 
but  to  conclude  that  sodium  burns  in  the  sun, 
because  the  sun  emits  a  similar  light,  does  not 
seem  reasonable ;  the  cases  are  far  enough 
from  being  adjacent,  and  the  circumstances 
are,  in  manifold  particulars,  very  unlike."  Mill's 
very  slender  basis  for  inductive  reasoning 
would  seem  to  be  as  suitable  to  confirm 
the  doubter  concerning  some  new  discov- 
ery in  physics*  as  the  writings  of  Colenso  to 
strengthen  faith  in  the  Pentateuch,  or  of  Strauss 
and  Baur  to  lead  to  confidence  in  the  Gospel 


By»t«m  (tf  Logic  B.  lii,  C.  xxi,  Sec.  5. 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


S9 


History.  But  the  defects  in  his  philosophy  of 
induction  are  necessary  consequences  of  his 
defective  and  uncertain  science  of  man's  power 
to  know.  The  signal  failure  of  one  of  the 
most  elaborate  attempts  that  has  ever  been 
made  to  furnish  a  scientific  foundation  for 
the  science  of  nature  is  explained  by  its  de- 
fective and  uncertain  science  of  man. 

The  defects  of  Mill's  philosophical  writings 
are  the  more  conspicuous,  the  more  sharply 
they  are  contrasted  with  their  manifold  excel- 
lencies. His  rules  for  the  practice  of  induc- 
tion are  comprehensive  and  sagacious,  and 
they  are  amply  illustrated  and  applied.  His 
observations  upon  classification  and  laniruaire 
are  rich  contributions  to  philosophical  litera- 
ture.   His  acuteness  in  criticising,  and  his  skill 


6o 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


in  exposing  the  vulnerable  points  of  antago- 
nistic  philosophies,  as  also  his  admirable  candor 
in  confessing  the  difficulties  of  his  own,  with  his 
something  more  than  admirable  unconscious- 
ness that  his  confessions  amount  to  a  com- 
plete surrender  of  everything  for  which  he 
would  contend,  forces  his  reader  at  times  to 
exclaim,  miranda  simplicitas  si  non  sancta. 
Like  Comte,  he  protests  that  he  does  not 
discuss  metaphysics,  but  only  logic;  striving 
to  set  up  a  distinction  between  the  reasons 
of  the  logical  rules  which  he  professes  to 
expound,  and  the  underlying  philosophical 
axioms  which  he  styles  transcendental  meta- 
physics. And  yet  these  he  is  constantly  obtrud- 
ing and  endeavoring  to  account  for ;  contending 
that  our  ideas  of  time  and  space,  the  conceptions 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


6i 


and  axioms  of  mathematics,  the  belief  in 
causation,  in  induction,  and  in  the  uniformity 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  are  all  derived  from 
experience ;  while  experience,  with  its  author- 
ity for  the  distant  and  the  future,  is  the 
product  of  associations  that  have  become  so 
inseparably  blended  that  they  cannot  be  got 
rid  of. 

From  Mill,  we  proceed  to  the  ccrebralists^ 
to  Alexandce  Bain  and  his  school,  who 
limit  the  science  of  man  to  the  analysis  of 
the  brain  and  its  functions,  and  claim 
that  the  so-called  physiological  psychology  is 
the  only  basis  for  a  solid  science  of  the  soul. 
This  point  we  shall  not  contest;  we  urge 
only,  that  if  the  basis  is  broad  enough  for  a 
science  of  man,   ?t  is  neither  broad  nor  deep 


62 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


enough  to  support  a  science  of  nature.  Let  it 
be  granted  that  brain  convolutions  and  nerve 
vibrations  or  nerve  growths  may  account 
for  the  differences  and  developments  of  the 
human  soul ;  that  vision  is  simply  a  nervous  re- 
sponse to  the  undulating  light,  and  touch  is  an 
adjustment  of  particles  in  the  innerved  cuticle 
in  accordance  with  the  molecular  agitations  in 
the  solid  with  which  it  comes  in  contact.  Let 
it  be  granted  that  memory,  imagination,  classi- 
fication, and  reasoning,  are  but  material  forces 
newly  correlated  in  the  form  of  nervous  move- 
ments, and  that  what  is  called  self-consciousness 
IS  one  set  of  brain  fibres  dancing  a  mazy  anti- 
strophe  to  similar  fibres  in  a  corresponding 
brain  lobe.  Granting  that  all  of  man  which 
we  call  thought,  emotion,  and  aspiration,  is 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


63 


reducible  to  the  workings  of  mechanical  stat- 
ics and  dynamics,  we  fail  altogether  to  explain 
how  man,  so  constituted  and  so  acting,  can 
form  a  science  of  nature ;  how  Newton  came 
to  connect  the  falling  stone  with  the  moon 
steadily  detained  and  impetuously  struggling 
in  its  path,  and  ventured  to  write  down  the 
law  of  each  in  a  brief  algebraic  formula ;  nor 
how  Kirchhoff  happened  to  imagine  and  was 
inspired  to  believe,  that  he  could  see  the  burn- 
ing sodium  in  the  molten  crater  of  the  sun, 
and  could  follow  the  hydrogen  that  flashes  in 
jets  along  its  surface.  Let  cerebral  physiology 
do  what  it  will  in  its  movements  against  a  bet- 
ter theory  of  man  :  Let  it  call  into  its  aid  the 
portentous  battalions  of  the  correlated  forces  ; 
let  unconscious    cerebration  dart  in  and  out 


I 


64 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


of  the  conflict  with  its  wily  and  quick-mov- 
ing cavalry — one  and  all  fail  utterly  to  de- 
molish the  solid  squares  of  convictions  on 
which  the  intellectual  soul  must  plant  itself 
when  it  make  s  good  a  grand  discovery,  like 
those  of  Newton,  or  Davy,  or  Faraday,  or 
Kirchhoflf.  The  eloquent  John  Tyndall  has 
truly  said,  more  boldly  perhaps,  than  he  was 
aware,  and  forgetful  of  consistency  with  many 
of  his  teachings  :  *'  It  is  by  a  kind  of  inspiration 
that  we  rise  from  the  wise  and  sedulous  con- 
templation of  facts  to  the  principles  on  which 
they  depend."  **  This  passage  from  facts  to 
principles  is  called  induction,  which,  in  its 
highest  form,  is  inspiration.'*  *  Whatever  else 
may  be  true  of  the  brain   philosophy,  it  can 

♦  John  Tyndall.  Fracrm^nU  of  ScUnce^  p.  601 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


65 


never  explain  and  validate  induction,  with  the 
mystery  of  its  insight  into  nature's  secrets 
and  the  mastery  of  its  power  over  nature's 
forces. 


From  Comte  and  Mill,  and  the  cerebral- 
ists,  we  proceed  to  Herbert  Spencer^  who  claims 
to  be  more  profound  and  comprehensive 
than  them  all,  for  whom  his  adherents 
claim  that,  like  Kant,  he  is  the  zermabncndc 
Philosoph — the  all-crushing  of  these  times ; 
of  whom  it  is  asserted,  that  he  takes 
into  his  system  all  that  is  true  in  the  old 
metaphysical  and  the  new  positive  and 
brain  philosophies,  and  causes  everything  to 
reappear  with  a  profoundcr  meaning  and  a 
more  catholic  application.     We  cannot  charge 


y 


66 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


against  Spencer  that  he  neglects  or  dishonors 
the  science  of  man.  He  stands  foremost 
among  modern  writers  in  recognizing  psychol- 
ogy as  fundamental  to  all  philosophy,  whether 
of  matter  or  spirit.  He  may  be  said  to  accept 
spiritual  phenomena  as  having  existence  in 
their  own  right,  and  as  claiming  authority  over 
other  facts,  so  far  as  they  furnish  the  princi- 
ples for  every  department  of  philosophy.  He 
recognizes  fully  the  necessity  that  certain 
principles  should  be  necessary  and  axiomatic. 
So  far  all  is  hopeful  and  seemingly  all  that  a 
sound  philosophy  could  desire.  But  we  soon 
discover  that  these  fair  promises  are  sacrificed 
to  the  merciless  requirements  of  a  meta- 
physical hypothesis,  which  is  as  remorseless 
in   its   exactions   as  it  is  usurping   in  its  au- 


f 


• 


vs.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


67 


thority.  The  /aza  of  evolution^  acting  as  a 
movement  of  differentiation  and  integration,  is 
ushered  upon  the  scene,  destined,  like  Saturn, 
to  devour  its  own  children  as  fast  as  they  are 
produced.  It  is  itself  not  proved.  It  does  not 
claim  to  be  self-evident,  but  simply  that, 
like  Mill's  induction,  it  is  capable  of  being 
verified  by  every  individual  instance  to  which 
it  can  be  applied.  Its  terms  also  are  so  broad  as 
to  be  capable  of  a  great  variety  of  significa- 
tions. Evolution,  differentiation,  and  integra- 
tion, are  words  of  many-sided  import,  as 
Spencer's  use  of  them  satisfactorily  illustrates. 
Evolution  is  now  treated  as  though  it  were  a 
living  force,  endowed  with  the  energy, 
and  invested  with  the  wisdom  of  a  personal 
creator;    and   again    it   sinks  to  an   innocent 


68 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


symbolic  formula.  Differentiation  and  in- 
tegration now  rise  to  the  dignity  and  mystery 
of  organizing  forces,  and  anon  they  sink 
into  the  meaningless  platitudes  of  insignifi- 
cant logical  generalizations.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  with  phrases  so  vague  in  their  import  and 
so  plastic  in  their  application,  the  mysteries 
of  the  universe  are  often  explained  by  Spencer 
in  the  manner  of  a  dexterous  juggler — as 
plausibly  to  the  eye  and  as  unsatisfactorily 
to  the  mind. 

But  one  thing,  at  least,  Mr.  Spencer  has 
not  explained,  nor  does  he  in  any  wise  provide 
for;  and  that  is  the  possibility  of  a  science  of 
nature,  and  simply  because  by  his  theory  the 
principles  on  which  such  a  science  rests  are 
themselves  but  transient  waves,  thrown  up  for 


vs.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


69 


the  moment  by  an  ever-heaving  and  new-evolv- 
ing sea.  According  to  Spencer,  man  as  a  differ- 
entiated and  integrated  type  of  being,  is  physio- 
logically evolved  from  a  less  complex  type  of 
being.  Intelligence  is  a  more  complex  evolution 
of  life,  and  life  is  the  joint  product  of  interior 
and  exterior  relations.  Even  the  axioms  of 
intelligence,  which  Spencer  had  recognized  as 
the  necessary  and  ultimate  laws  of  thinking ; 
these  obey  the  same  law.  At  first  they  are 
sprouting  tendencies  towards  scientific  axioms, 
which  are  gradually  fixed  and  hardened  in  the 
brain,  so  as  to  strengthen  with  the  growth,  and 
be  transmitted  with  the  progress  of  successive 
generations.  The  conceptions  of  time  and 
space,  and  the  relations  they  involve,  follow 
this  rule,  being  perfected  and  adjusted  by  a 


70 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


long  course  of  physiological  evolutions.  This 
is  man  according  to  Spencer.  Is  he  competent 
to  attain  to  a  science  of  nature  ?  Behold  him 
on  some  bright  morning  of  the  evolving  a^ons 
just  ushered  into  being — **  like  the  herald  Mer- 
cury, new-lighted  on  some  heaven-kissing  hill/' 
which  he  spurns  with  his  impatient  foot,  as 
just  about  to  leave  the  earth  for  some  higher 
sphere.  He  looks  out  upon  nature,  that  he 
may  interpret  its  laws,  he  geometrizes  among 
the  stars  like  a  God,  he  weighs  the  mountains 
in  balances,  he  takes  up  the  isles  as  a  very  little 
thing,  he  reads  the  history  of  the  earth  turn- 
ing back  its  rocky  laminae  one  by  one  and 
interpreting  the  characters  that  speak  from 
each.  He  catches  the  light,  and  unfolds  it 
into     spectra    of    beauty,     finding    in     each 


vs.  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


71 


one  of  its  glowing  bars  some  secret  of 
nature's  hidden  magic.  He  studies  the 
composition  of  matter,  its  crystalline  order- 
ings  of  method  and  symmetry,  and  its  chemical 
affinities  and  transmutations.  He  attempts  the 
more  difficult  problem  of  life  ;  he  pauses  in  as- 
tonishment before  the  profounder  mystery  of 
the  soul.  Next  he  essays  to  account  for  the 
origin  of  these  varied  forms  of  being,  and  by 
one  daring  sweep  of  generalization,  he  thinks 
to  comprehend  and  explain  the  universe.  By 
the  magic  of  a  formula,  as  vague  as  it  is  broad, 
he  thinks  he  discovers  that  matter  and  spirit, 
that  thoughts  and  things,  are  evolved  by  a  self- 
moving  tendency,  after  which  life  is  lifted  out 
from  death,  and  intelligence  springs  forth 
from  life.     He  asserts  that  the  science  of  the 


72 


THE  SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF   MAN. 


73 


universe  is   unravelled    by  a  nevvly-corrcctcd 
science  of  man,   adjusted  to  his  metaphysical 
theory.  But  is  it  so?  Has  Spencer  succeeded  ? 
Let  it  be  granted  that  so  long  as  man  endures 
as  a  persistent  type  of  knowing  force,  with  his 
interior   relations—/,  e,,  his  powers,  his  cate- 
gories,  his  time  and  space— that  so  long  the 
science  of  the  universe,  which  is  built    up  by 
the  application  of  them  all,  may  stand  and  be 
trusted  as  true.    But  what  is  to  happen  at  the 
next  evolution  of  this  ascending  spiral  stair- 
case, when  another  form  of  knowing  energy  is 
evolved  with  its  new  and  more  complex  fur- 
nishings?  May  not  some  new  interior  relations 
emerge— some    powers  and  modes  of  think- 
ing,  some   principles  of  science   itself,  which 
shall  reverse   the  science  of  to-day,  and  cause 


the  principles  of  Newton,  the  logic  of  Mill,  and 
the  first  principles  of  Spencer  himself,  to  be 
but  an  empty  babble,  because  they  are  all 
outgrown  ;  the  intellect  newly  evolved  finding 
in  them  no  import,  and  acknowledging  in 
them  no  authority  ? 

To  this  it  will  be  replied,  that  Mr.  Spencer 
assumes  that  there  can  be  no  new  evolution  of 
the  power  to  know,  which  does  not  correspond 
to  some  new  objective  relation  in  that  which 
is  known  ;  that  while  it  is  true  that  the  beliefs 
in  time  and  space  are  themselves  developed,  he 
assumes  that  there  correspond  to  them  certain 
exterior  relations ;  that  in  fact,  he  even  goes 
further  and  surrounds  this  finite  universe  with 
the  incomprehensible  somewhat,  whom  he 
allows  us  to  believe,  provided  we  will  concede 


74 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS.  THE   SCIENCE   OF  MAN. 


75 


that  what  we  believe  does  not  correspond  to 
the  truth ;  and  summons  us  to  worship,  provided 
we  will  confess  that  we  worship  we  know  not 
what.  He  does  indeed  assume  all  this.  But  by 
what  authority  does  he  enforce  these  dogmas  ? 
except  by  the  impressions  of  a  being  who  is 
himself  evolved,  and  whose  power  to  believe 
that  there  are  realities  which  answer  to  his  own 
interior  relations,  is  itself  a  transient  interior 
relation  which  has  been  evolved  from  the 
agencies  that  have  chanced  to  produce  it,  and 
whose  methods  of  knowing  are  themselves  the 
products  of  an  evolving  and  changing  physio- 
logical growth.  If  the  man  of  the  present 
aeon,  as  the  philosophy  of  Spencer  explains, 
is  warranted  in  trusting  the  axioms  of  evolu- 
tion and  the  persistence  of  force,  then   these 


axioms  are  something  higher  and  more  au- 
thoritative than  physiological  products,  evolved 
by  the  coincidence  of  exterior  and  interior  rela- 
tions. If  Mr.  Spencer's  First  Principles,  or  the 
first  principles  of  any  other  philosopher,  are  to 
be  received  as  the  foundations  of  science,  they 
are  good  for  all  time,  for  all  the  past  and  all 
the  future.  They  have  a  higher  and  more  per- 
manent authority  than  his  special  theory  can 
vouch  for.  The  sciences  of  nature  and  spirit 
which  he  expounds  cannot  stand  upon  any 
foundations  which  he  provides  for  their  sup- 
port in  his  science  of  man.  Every  such  science 
is  weak  just  in  proportion  to  the  sweep  of  its 
pretensions  and  the  accumulation  of  its  facts. 
It  is  like  an  imposing  engine  that  is  reared 
upon  a  pedestal  that  is  massive  to  the  eye,  but 


\ 


1^ 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


77 


which  crushes  its  foundations  into  sand  by  the 
first  movements  of  its  ponderous  and  compli- 
cated structure. 

The  position  which  Spencer  holds  among 
the  philosophers  of  our  time  is  so  unique  as  to 
justify,  if  not  to  require,  special  attention. 
Many-sided  in  his  culture,  especially  on  the  side 
of  physics,  mathematics  and  natural  history, 
and  apparently  familiar  with  the  history  of 
human  culture  and  human  progress,  he  seems 
to  command  an  inexhaustible  fund  of  pertinent 
and  attractive  illustrations.  If  he  is  not  always 
clear  in  announcing  his  principles,  if  his  argu- 
ments do  not  always  convince  us  of  the  truth 
of  what  we  do  understand,  the  wealth  and 
variety  of  his  facts  never  fail  to  delight  and  as- 
tonish the  confiding  reader  who  cannot  find  it 


in  his  heart  to  distrust  so  well  furnished  a  writer. 
The  apparent  breadth  and  daring  of  his  gener- 
alizations surprise  the  student  who  does  not 
consider  that  philosophical  genius  is  as  strik- 
ingly displayed  in  the  acute  detection  of  subtle 
differences  as  in  the  vague  suggestion  of  broad 
and   meaningless    similarities.      The   catholic 
spirit  with  which  he  seems  to  desire  to  do  jus- 
tice to  every  system  of  philosophy  and  relig- 
ion, prepares  for  an  easy  credence  of  the  uni- 
versnl    solvent  which  promises  to  decompose 
them  all.     The  positiveness  of  his  manner  and 
the  dogmatism  of  his  assertions,  which  increase 
with  the  paradoxical  character  of  his  opinions, 
are  elements  of  power  with  readers  whose  cre- 
dulity rises  with  the  daring  of  their  admired 
and  trusted  leader.     It  would  not  be  fair  to 


78 


THE   SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


79 


say  that,  so  far  as  matter  is  concerned,  Spencer 
writes  like  a  sophist  or  a  charlatan,  for  the 
reason  that  he  instructs  in  too  many  single 
and  important  truths.  But  it  is  not  unjust  to 
assert  that  in  method  and  manner,  he  is  mas- 
ter of  the  art  of  imposing  exposition.  The 
reader  who  has  had  some  experience  in  the 
necessary  art  of  searching  for  a  meaning  and 
method  in  writers,  in  which  neither  is  obvious, 
will  often  lay  down  Spencer  in  despair,  if  not 
with  disgust,for  his  stealthy  subreptions,  his  cool 
word-plays,  his  confounding  of  inductions  with 
axioms,  and  his  sacrifice  of  common  sense  to 
the  requirements  of  an  unproved  theory.  The 
clearness  of  his  diction  is  no  compensation  for 
the  lack  of  that  earnestness  and  verve  which 
are  the  never-failing  indications  of  the  highest 


qualities  of  genius.  The  coolness  of  his  man- 
ner rather  betrays  than  hides  the  conscious- 
ness of  paradox.  His  attempt  to  reconcile 
philosophy  with  religion  proves  his  concep- 
tions of  both  to  be  superficial.  No  well-read 
student  of  philosophy  can  hesitate  to  believe 
that,  notwithstanding  the  zeal  of  his  admirers, 
he  will  cease  to  be  the  wonder  of  the  hour ; 
that  so  soon  as  the  secret  of  his  plausibility 
is  exposed  he  will  suffer  a  more  complete 
neglect  than  he  will  fairly  deserve."^ 

*  The  author  takes  the  liberty  to  call  the  attention  of  his  reader  to 
the  fact  that  tills  is  a  metaphysical  essay  or  meditation,  the  argument 
of  which  is  directed  to  a  sinjjle  conclusion,  and  is  in  no  sense  a  compre- 
hensive treatise  or  criticism  of  any  system  of  philosophy.  While  he 
claims  no  exemption  from  the  ohlijration  to  iuterpret  Spencer's  doc- 
trines correctly,  and  to  state  them  honestly,  he  does  not  consider 
himself  required  to  expound  his  system  at  leuglh,  or  to  show  that  in 
many  of  the  positions  to  wliich  he  attaches  very  great  importance, 
and  urges  with  the  greatest  persistence,  he  is  flagrantly  inconsistent 


8o 


THE   SCIE^XES  OF  NATURE 


These  arguments  and  criticisms  must  suffice. 
We  do  not  urge  that  a  profound  study  of  man, 


with  himself;  that  he  not  only  goes  beyond  the  range  of  knowledge 
and  belief  to  which  be  had  limited  himself  by  his  theory  of  evolution, 
but  introduces  assumptions  for  which  hU  system  piakes  no  provis- 
ion. With  the  mot>t  earnest  desire  to  understand  Spencer,  and  some 
eflort  to  reconcile  his  doctrines  with  one  another  in  logical  and  phil- 
osophical coherence,  we  can  find  no  place  in  his  theory  for  what 
he  calls  Ultimate  Rdifjious  Ideas,  for  the  reality  of  which  he  contends 
so  earnestly  as  against  Hamilton  and  Mansel,  with  naive  unc  n- 
gciousness  of  any  iucontfisteucy  with  his  own  theory  of  knowledge  ; 
on  which  theory,  however,  he  does  not  hesitate  to  fall  back  at  once  as 
soon  as  he  seeks  to  demonstrate  their  perpetual  unknoivaXUmess  by  man. 
>ior  is  it  any  easier  to  see  how  this  theory  allows  him  to  diftin,:ui.«-h 
between  a  foi'mvlaUA  and  unformulated  comci'.ttsneis,  after  having 
shut  himself  up  to  that  consciousness  which  is  formulated ;  nor  how 
his  explanation  of  the  ger^sU  of  the  ideas  of  space  and  time  by  evolu- 
tion, can  provide  at  all  for  his  belief  of  the  necessity  or  universaliiy 
of  thefe  ideas,  or  of  the  realities  which  correspond  to  them ;  nor  how 
the  philosopher  who  has  limited  the  researches  of  science  to  the  rela- 
tions of  coexistence  and  sequence,  and  has  thereby  formally  excluded 
fie  relation  of  cauriation,  should  abruptly  introduce  ns  to  something 
which  he  denominates  force,  which  he  oracularly  informs  us  is 
Inscrutable,  and  concludes  therefrom  that  matter  and  spirit  may 
therefore  be  mutually  convertible  and  interch.uiu'eablo.  Tlu;  reader 
who  chooses  to  make  the  txpcrimcnt  for  himsilf,  of  expliining  and 


VS.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


8l 


or  a  formal  recognition  of  the  principles  which 
underlie  the  study  of  nature,  are  essential  to 
eminent  attainments  in  special  sciences,  or  to 
enlarged  and  liberal  views  of  scientific  research. 
The  working  formulas  of  a  single  science,  and, 
indeed,  of  many,  may  be  mastered  by  an  adept, 
and  skilfully  applied  to  brilliant  achievments, 
almost  without  the  suspicion  that  they  can  be 
justified  hy  a  philosophic  method.     The  prin- 
ciples and  methods  of  induction  are  practically 
taught  by  nature  and  common  sense  to  every 
one  who  is  willing  to  use  them.     But  should 
any  one  be  questioned  or  denied,   either   in 
obedience  to  the  private  maxims  of  a  special 


reconciling  these  incoherences  of  Spencer,  is  referred  to  his  Flrn 
Principles,  Part  I.,  Chapters  11.,  ill.,  and  Iv.  Part  II.,  Chapter  v.,  and 
7^  PHnciples  of  PiycJiologv,  Part  IV.,  Chapter  vii.,  %  308. 


82 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


7'S.  THE   SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


83 


philosophy,  or  the  spirit  of  a  narrow  and 
special  study  of  a  part  of  nature  called  physics, 
they  must  be  recognized  and  defended, 
and  in  order  that  they  may  be  defended  and 
recognized,  they  must  be  carefully  studied  by 
a  thorough  examination  of  man. 

For  this  study,  the  devotee  of  any  special 
science  may  be  the  more  disqualified  in  pro- 
portion to  his  zeal  and  success  in  his  own  de- 
partment. But  for  this  very  reason,  the  greater 
may  be  his  confidence  in  pronouncing  upon 
questions  of  this  sort,  and  with  a  positiveness 
which  is  proportioned  to  his  incompetence. 
Nothing  is  more  arrogant,  and  nothing  ought 
to  be  more  offensive,  than  that  the  powers  and 
principles  on  which  all  science  and  induction 
depends,  should  be  resolved  by  or  after  analo- 


gies  derived  from  the  mechanics  of  matter  and 
the  dynamics  of  life.     To  narrowness  of  this 
sort  the  sciences  of  nature  offer  special  temp- 
tations.   The  objects  are  so  real,  the  processes 
are  so  definite,  the  experiments  are  so  satisfy- 
ing, the  enthusiasm  is  so  contagious,  that  the 
devotee  is  tempted  occasionally  to  forget  that 
he  is  a  man  as  well  as  a  scientist,  and  to  adjust 
his  estimates  of  human  science  and  culture*,  and 
even  of  man's  power  to  know,  by  a  standard 
taken    from  a   single  and    a    narrow    sphere. 
He    that  would   converse    with  Nature   with 
effect,  in  these  times,  must  retire  apart  into  a 
separate  cave  that  is  lonely  and  far  withdrawn. 
Within  its  recesses  alone  docs  Nature  whisper 
her  choicest  secrets,  and  after  a  long  and  pain- 
ful  initiation  of  the  devotee.     To  his  uplifted 


84 


THE   SCIENCES   OF   NATURE 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


85 


torch  alone  does  she  reveal  the  starry  roof  and 
the  brilliant  vision.     No  wonder  that  when  he 
emerges   into  the  light  of  common  day  he  is 
as   one   dazed  and  bewildered,  and  talks    of 
common   things   with   strange   and  perverted 
speech.      A    one-sided   cultivation,    with    its 
positiveness     and    not    ill-grounded    conceit, 
is  not  barbarism  indeed  ;  but  it  is  not  culture, 
in    the    large    and    generous    sense    of    the 
term.      A    system    of    education,    which     is 
bent     upon    training    specialists   in    any   de- 
partment,   may    be    defective    in    proportion 
to     the     completeness     with     which     it    ab- 
sorbs and   limits  the  energies  of  its  devotees. 
That  the  study  of  man  is  fitted  to  correct  these 
exclusive    tendencies  has  been  demonstrated 
by  the  many  eminent  examples  which  modern 


physics  has  furnished  of  philosophers  dis- 
tinguished alike  for  imaginative  genius,  careful 
observation  and  speculative  interest  concern- 
ing the  nature  of  man  and  the  methods  of  sci- 
ence. That  these  tendencies  need  to  be  cor- 
rected is  as  strikingly  proved  by  the  number 
of  scientists  of  another  sort,  who  are  not  con- 
tent with  a  well-earned  reputation  within  their 
own  departments,  but  set  themselves  to  reform 
psychology  and  metaphysics  after  the  law  of  the 
dissecting  room,  and  to  correct  theology  in  very 
extemporized  Lay  ScnnonsJ^ 


♦The  writer  has  no  dej«irc  to  say  hard  things  of  Mr.  Huxley,  be- 
cause ho  has  chosen  to  adopt  the  title  of  Lay  Sermons  for  certain  of 
his  discourses.  But  he  cannot  av<»id  the  impression  that  he  would 
have  done  mucli  more  wisely  had  he  pursued  a  course  with  respect 
to  metapliysics  and  theolo-jy,  similar  to  that  which  he  does  not  hesi- 
tate to  recommend  to  clcr^'ymcn  and  metaphysicians  with  respect  to 
science,  t.  e.,  had  he  let  the  u  alone.    The  confldent  utterancea  in 


86 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


We  do  not  overlook  the  truth,  that  the  stu- 
dent of  man  is  exposed  to  a  narrowness  and 
dogmatism  of  his  own,  and  can  learn  much,  if 

he  will,  from  the  sciences  of  nature.  All  these 
sciences  are  but  the  products  of  the  varied 
applications  of  his  spiritual  power  to  the  inves- 
tigation of  that  truth  which  must  be  tested  by 
experiment,  and  enforced  as  fact.  A  mistake 
in  the  investigation  of  nature  is  not  only  certain 
to  issue  in  failure  in  discovery,  but  it  at  once 
attracts  attention  to  the  error  of  method  in 
the  experiment  or  of  principle  in  the  theory. 
Nature  is  fearfully  and  sternly  realistic.     She 


respect  to  the  fundamental  problem,  of  philosophy  and  the  truths  and 
duties  of  religion,  which  are  freely  eTprempod  in  many  of  these  dig" 
courses,  appear  to  the  greatest  disadvantage  when  contranted  with 
tl»e  purely  sciontific  expositions  into  whicli  they  arc  interwoven. 
They  seem  to  have  many  of  the  worst  characteristics  of  the  most 
offensive  descriptions  of  sensational  proachinj;. 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF   MAN. 


87 


abhors  the  brilliant  vagaries,  the  imaginative 
rhapsodies,  the  cloudy  phraseology  and  dream- 
ing idealism  in  which  the  one-sided  student  of 
man  and  of  metaphysics  is  tempted  to  indulge. 
While  she  suggests  an  elevating  and  spiritual 
philosophy  of  her  own,  and  hides  a  magnifi- 
cent history  in  her  past,  as  well  as  veils  a  more 
splendid  romance  in  the  future,  she  deals 
very  summarily  with  the  metaphysical  cos- 
mologies, the  idealistic  physics,  and  realistic 
logics  which  imaginative  students  have  put  off 
as  a.  priori  philosophies  of  nature.  The  stu- 
dent of  the  mind  and  of  man,  who  has  been 
schooled  by  a  close  and  stern  wrestling  with 
the  forces  and  laws  of  matter,  cannot  but 
carry  the  lessons  which  he  has  learned  into 
the  study  of  the  soul  and  of  the  methods  of 


88  THE   SCIENXES  OF  NATURE 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE  OF    MAN. 


89 


science.     He  will  exact  from  others  and  im- 
pose on  himself  severe  requirements  in  respect 
of  clear  definition,  rigorous  logic,  well-ground- 
ed analogies  and  coherent  arrangement.     The 
best  security  against  the  recurrence  of  that 
metaphysical  romancing  by  which  the  science 
of  man  and  the  logic  of  science  have  been  dis- 
honored   in  the  past  is  to  be  found   in    the 
methods  to  which  physics  are  so  vigorously 
held.       Under  the  pressure  of  these  lessons 
the  metaphysics   of  the  future  are  likely  to 
prove  sober  and  discreet.    If  they  should  need 
any  additional  warning  from  this  quarter,  they 
can  find  them  in  the  examples  of  extravagant 
metaphysics  which  are  furnished  by  the  physi- 
cists  and    physiologists    who   would    develop 
man  and  the  inductive  philosophy  itself  from 


the  crucible,  a  bean-stalk  or  the  gorilla  ;  or  the 
metaphysicians,  who  answer  all  possible  ques- 
tion concerning  the  universe,  by  a  formula  of 
sequences  and  similitudes,  and  a  law  of  evolu- 
tion forever  proceeding  from  some  worshipful 
ufikfiozcabie. 

The  study  of  man    is    not   necessarily   the 
study  of  psychology  or  speculative  philosophy. 
Man    is  made  manifest  in  history,  philology, 
literature,   art,   politics,  ethics   and   theology. 
The   thoughts  of   man   have  recognized  and 
accepted  those  principles  and  institutions,those 
manners  and  laws,  that  civilization  and  culture 
which  give  security  and  grace  to  the  present 
life,  which  awaken  the  anticipations  and  con- 
firm the  faiths  which  reach  into  another.     The 
study  of  all  these  is  a  study  oU/ic  humanities. 


go 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


It  enables  us  to  understand  man,  and  to 
benefit  man  not  only  as  he  interprets  and  con- 
trols what  we  call  nature,  but  as  he  inter- 
prets and  controls  that  which  is  highest 
in  nature,  /.  ^.,  man  himself. 

This  suggests  the  thought  that  the  science 
of  nature  is  not  only  related  to  the  science  of 
man  because  man  interprets  nature,  but  be- 
cause man  is  a  part  of  nature,  and  nature 
cannot  be  truly  and  liberally  interpreted  unless 
man,  in  his  higher  capacities,  is  embraced 
within  her  plan  and  made  the  end  of  her  agen- 
cies. That  is  a  very  narrow  view  of  nature  which 
only  finds  in  nature  physical  agencies,  and 
limits  her  resources  to  mechanics  and  chem- 
istry, but  discovers  no  place  in  her  broad  ex- 
panses or  her  generous   provinces,  for  spirit 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


91 


or  intelligence ;  accepting  no  man  but  proto- 
plasm.     That  is  also   a  narrow  view  which 
recognizes    man's    higher    endowments    and 
destiny,    but    allows    them    a    scanty    place 
and  meaning  in  the  scientific  interpretation  of 
the  physical   arrangements   of   the   universe. 
The  science   of   man   and   of   man's    higher 
nature  in  its  highest  developments,  is  essen- 
tial  to  a  science  of  nature,  because   nature 
itself  cannot  be  interpreted  except  as  designed 
for  the  uses  and  culture  and  development  of  man 
as  a  spiritual  being.     Thus  to  interpret  nature 
does   indeed  require  that   we   assume  design 
in  nature.     But  all  philosophy  must  assume 
this,  so  far  as  it  interprets  the  past  or  forecasts 
the  future.     The  positive  philosophy  does  this 
when    it    assumes    that    "the    relations    of 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


91 


90 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


It  enables  us  to  understand  man,  and  to 
benefit  man  not  only  as  he  interprets  and  con- 
trols what  we  call  nature,  but  as  he  inter- 
prets and  controls  that  which  is  highest 
in  nature,  /.  ^.,  man  himself. 

This  suggests  the  thought  that  the  science 
of  nature  is  not  only  related  to  the  science  of 
man  because  man  interprets  nature,  but  be- 
cause man  is  a  part  of  nature,  and  nature 
cannot  be  truly  and  liberally  interpreted  unless 
man,  in  his  higher  capacities,  is  embraced 
within  her  plan  and  made  the  end  of  her  agen- 
cies. That  is  a  very  narrow  view  of  nature  which 
only  finds  in  nature  physical  agencies,  and 
limits  her  resources  to  mechanics  and  chem- 
istry, but  discovers  no  place  in  her  broad  ex- 
panses or  her  generous  provinces,  for  spirit 


or  intelligence ;  accepting  no  man  but  proto- 
plasm.     That  is  also   a  narrow  view  which 
recognizes    man's    higher    endowments    and 
destiny,    but    allov/s    them    a    scanty    place 
and  meaning  in  the  scientific  interpretation  of 
the  physical   arrangements   of   the   universe. 
The   science  of   man   and   of   man's    hieher 
nature  in  its  highest  developments,  is  essen- 
tial  to  a  science  of  nature,  because   nature 
itself  cannot  be  interpreted  except  as  designed 
for  the  uses  and  culture  and  development  of  man 
as  a  spiritual  being.     Thus  to  interpret  nature 
does   indeed  require  that  we  assume  design 
in  nature.     But  all  philosophy  must  assume 
this,  so  far  as  it  interprets  the  past  or  forecasts 
the  future.     The  positive  philosophy  does  this 
when    it    assumes    that    "the    relations    of 


92 


THE   SCIENCES   OF  NATURE 


sequence  and  similitude"  are  constant,  that 
is,  are  always  the  same  in  the  same  circum- 
stances. Darwin  and  Spencer  both  assume  that 
there  is  a  plan  of  successive  development  or 
evolution  provided  for  in  the  infinite  capacities 
of  the  undeveloped  germs,  if  such  began  at  all, 
or  in  their  still  more  enlarged  capabilities 
of  successive  evolution  and  disintegration,  if 
the  march  of  evolution  is  in  cycles  returning 
upon  one  another.  It  would  seem  that  the 
wise  intelligence  assumed  for  this  law  of  evolu- 
tion would  draw  so  heavily  upon  the  faith  of 
its  defenders,  as  to  leave  them  little  courage  to 
sneer  at  the  theory  of  creation,  as  "  the  car- 
penter theory."  But  upon  questions  of 
consistency  or  taste,  we  have  no  room  to 
enlarge.     We  contend  at  present  only  for  the 


VS,  THE   SCIENCE   OF  MAN. 


93 


position  that  we  cannot  have  a  science  of 
nature  which  does  not  regard  the  spirit  of 
man  as  a  part  of  nature. 

But  is  this  all?  Do  man  and  nature  ex- 
haust the  possibilities  of  being?  We  cannot 
answer  this  question  here.  But  we  find  sug- 
gestions from  the  spectrum  and  the  spectro- 
scope which  may  be  worth  our  heeding.  The 
materials  with  which  we  have  to  do  in 
their  most  brilliant  scientific  theories  seem  at 
first  to  overwhelm  us  with  their  vastness  and 
complexity.  The  bulks  are  so  enormous,  the 
forces  are  so  mighty,  the  laws  are  so  wide- 
sweeping  and  at  times  so  pitiless,  the  dis- 
tances are  so  over-mastering,  even  the  uses 
and  beauties  are  so  bewildering,  that  we  bow 
in  mute  and  almost  abject  subjection  to  the 


94 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


incomprehensible  all ;  of  which  we  hesitate  to 
affirm  aught,  except  what  has  been  manifest 
to  our  observant  senses  and  connected  by  our 
inseparable  associations.  We  forget  what  our 
overmastering  thought  has  done  in  subjecting 
this  universe  to  its  interpretations.  Its  vast 
distances  have  been  annihilated,  for  we  have 
connected  the  distant  with  the  near  by  the 
one  pervading  force  which  Newton  divined. 
We  have  analyzed  the  flame  that  burns  in  our 
lamp  and  the  flame  that  burns  in  the  sun  by 
the  same  instrument — connecting  by  a  com- 
mon affinity,  at  the  same  instant  and  under  the 
same  eye,  two  agents,  the  farthest  removed  in 
place  and  the  most  subtle  in  essence.  As  we 
have  overcome  distances,  so  we  have  con- 
quered time,  reading  the  story  of  antecedent 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN.  9$ 


cycles  with  a  confidence  equal  to  that  with 
which  we  forecast  the  future  ages.  The  phil- 
osopher who  penetrates  the  distant  portions 
of  the  universe  by  the  omnipresence  of  his 
scientific  generalizations,  who  reads  the  secret 
of  the  sun  by  the  glance  of  his  penetrating 
eye,  has  little  occasion  to  deny  that  all  its 
forces  may  be  mastered  by  a  single  all-knowing 
and  omnipresent  Spirit,  and  that  its  secrets  can 
be  read  by  one  all-seeing  Eye.  The  scientist 
who  evolves  the  past  in  his  confident  thought, 
under  a  few  grand  titles  of  generalized  forces 
and  relations,  and  who  develops  and  almost 
gives  law  to  the  future  by  his  faith  in  the  per- 
sistence of  force  has  little  reason  to  question 
the  existence  of  an  intellect  capable  of  deeper 
insight    and    larger  foresight   than   his  own. 


96 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE 


which  can  grasp  all  the  past  and  the  future 
by  an  all-comprehending  intelligence,  and  can 
control  its  wants  by  a  personal  energy  that  is 
softened  to  personal  tenderness  and  love. 

We  blame  not  the  scientific  discovei^when, 
fresh  from  some  triumphant  experiment  he 
rejoices  in  the  consciousness  of  power.  We 
wonder  not  that  he  rises  from  his  feat  of  dis- 
covery with  a  sense  of  mastery  and  dominion. 
Man,  by  thought,  is  THE  KiNG  of  the  uni- 
verse, so  far  as  by  thought  he  masters  its 
secrets  and  lays  his  hand  upon  its  forces.  Let 
him  be  crowned  as  King  by  science,  and  let 
no  one  dispute  his  right  to  rule.  But  let 
him  never  forget  that  it  is  only  by  the  right 
which  spirit  asserts  over  matter  —  which 
thought   assumes   over  things — that  he    has 


I, 


vs.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  MAN. 


9T 


i 


gained  this  dominion,  and  that  he  can  extend 
it  only  as  he  learns  more  wisely  how  to  know 
and  use  his  own  sagacious  self-relying  mind. 

But  has  nature  no  other  king?    To  answer 
this  question  fully  lies  not  within  our  scope. 

The  suggestions  which  we  have  made,  would 
seem  to  establish  the  conclusion  that  the  sci- 
ences of  nature,  when  viewed  in  their  funda- 
mental .philosophy,  do  not  necessarily  lead 
to  Atheism.  The  history  of  these  sciences  of 
nature  moreover  testifies  that  while  the  dex- 
terous workers  in  experiments  may  successfully 
apply  the  formulae  which  the  thinkers  have  fur- 
nished, and  be  content  to  look  no  further ;  the 
architects  and  philosophers  of  nature  have  uni- 
formly discovered  the  foundations  of  a 
philosophy  of  nature  in  the  spirit  of  man, 


■ttif 


98 


THE  SCIENCES  OF  NATURE. 


as  capable  of  thinking  the  thoughts  o! 
God.  The  nature  of  science,  as  justi- 
fied by  the  mind  of  man,  also  reveals  the  truth 
that  its  methods  and  assumptions  are  but 
varied  acknowledgments  of  an  originating  in- 
telligence, whose  thoughts  and  purposes  we 
interpret  just  so  far  as  we  discover  the  forces, 
determine  the  laws,  or  explain  the  history 
of  the  universe. 


;:  coI..L^• 


^--T 


--  J 


I 


Mi 


Ml] 


I 


ll'i 


.  ^  ^    "  *fef  -  -w 


^: 


-■*'i 


■^-^1' 


\ , 


